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Abstract
This paper analyses the interplay of capacity utilisation, capacity constraints, de-
mand constraints and price adjustments, employing a unique rm-level data set for
Swiss manufacturing rms. Theoretically, capacity constraints limit the ability of
rms to expand production in the short run and lead to increases in prices. Our re-
sults show that, on the one hand, price increases are more likely during periods when
rms are faced with capacity constraints. Constraints due to the shortage of labour,
in particular, lead to price increases. On the other hand, we also nd evidence that
rms are not reluctant to reduce prices in response to demand constraints. At the
macro level, the implied capacity-utilisation Phillips curve has a convex shape during
periods of excess demand and a concave shape during periods of excess supply. Our
results are robust to the inclusion of proxies for changes in costs and the competitive
position of rms.
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11 Introduction
Measures for capacity utilisation rates have long been used as a determinant for upcoming
inationary pressures and therefore are a useful tool for monetary policy. Central banks
use these measures to enable them to calculate future risks to price stability and therefore
react in a forward looking manner. However, the relationship between the rate of capacity
utilisation and ination is not necessarily linear. If capacity constraints limit the ability of
rms to meet cyclical increases in the overall level of demand, the short-run relationship
between output and ination will tend to have a curved shape, with ination becoming
more sensitive to changes in output when the cycle of economic activity is high than when
it is low (MacKlem, 1997). Empirical estimates that impose linearity might therefore over-
or underestimate the inationary risk of the current state of the business cycle. Failures to
account for non-linearity might thus have strong implications for monetary policy reaction
functions. If Phillips curves are non-linear, this implies that monetary policy makers
operating with a linear Taylor type rule create a welfare loss (Laxton et al., 1999). The
central question for empirical models therefore is: Do capacity constraints put additional
pressure on prices? And, if so, is the impact of such constraints on prices sizeable? So far,
several studies have investigated the non-linearity in the relationship between real activity
and ination using macroeconomic variables. However, as compared to the theoretical
literature, empirical research has produced mixed ndings.1 One reason for such mixed
ndings might be that capacity constraints cannot be observed directly in macroeconomic
time series on capacity utilisation rates. Researchers have usually included a squared term
of the output gap or a kinked functional form, assuming that the slope of the Phillips
1The most intensively studied country is the U.S. For example, Gordon (1997) and Yates (1998) nd
that the U.S. Phillips curve is linear. On the contrary, Debelle and Laxton (1996) and Clark et al. (2001)
conclude that the U.S. Phillips curve is convex. Filardo (1998) nds evidence that it is convex-concave.
Similar mixed results are reported for European countries. For example, Dolado et al. (2005) and Baghli
et al. (2007) provide some evidence for the relevance of non-linearity in the euro area Phillips curve, while
Musso et al. (2007) nd no signicant evidence of non-linearity.
2curve in excess supply situations diers from that in excess demand situations. Thus, the
common practice is to assume that rms experience capacity constraints during periods of
very high real activity. This, however, raises the question: Even if a non-linearity is found
in macro data, are the sources of the steeper Phillips curve during periods of high real
activity really capacity constraints?2 There cannot be a clear-cut answer to this without
observing capacity constraints directly. Furthermore, as we will show in the micro data,
there exists a substantial degree of heterogeneity across rms. This is also a point that
cannot be controlled for in studies employing macro data.
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to give answers to the questions raised above,
by investigating the role of capacity utilisation and capacity constraints for the price-
setting behaviour of rms using micro data. A unique panel dataset of quarterly data of
Swiss manufacturing rm surveys from 1999-2007, conducted by the KOF Swiss Economic
Institute, allows us to analyse the role of capacity constraints for the pricing behaviour
of rms. There are two main advantages of utilising micro data. First, we can directly
observe whether or not a rm is faced with a capacity constraint. Second, we can match
the capacity utilisation rate and the presence of constraints to rms' pricing decisions and
therefore account for the high degree of heterogeneity we nd across rms. We nd that
high capacity utilisation does not necessarily correlate with the presence of constraints at
the rm level. Some rms already indicate capacity constraints at capacity utilisation rates
of 90 percent, whereas others indicate no capacity constraints at utilisation rates of 100
percent. Using aggregate series of capacity utilisation in the whole economy and a squared
2There are alternative explanations for a convex Phillips curve. For example, Ball et al. (1988) show
that, in the presence of menu costs, not all rms will change their prices in response to a particular
demand shock. However, the more rms that decide to change their prices, the more responsive will be
the aggregate price level to demand shocks. In their model, rms increase the frequency and size of price
adjustment as ination rises, so aggregate demand shocks will have less eect on output and more eect
on the price level. Ball and Mankiw (1994) discuss another implication of menu costs. In the presence
of trend ination, prices should be more exible upwards than downwards because some rms are able
to obtain relative price declines from trend ination without changing their own prices and incurring real
costs. The model could thus imply a convex Phillips curve that becomes linear as ination approaches
zero. See Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998).
3term as a proxy for capacity constraints might therefore lead to the mixed results found
in previous studies. We nd that rms that currently employ a higher than average use of
their capacity are signicantly more likely to increase prices, and the probability that they
will decrease prices is lower. Furthermore, the existence of capacity constraints leads to a
signicantly higher probability of price increases. According to our estimates, a rm under
constrained capacities due to the shortage of labour has a ten percent higher probability
of increasing prices, and a rm that indicates capacity constraints due to restrictions in
technical capacities has a six percent higher probability of raising prices. These estimates
are conditional on holding capacity utilisation at the average.
In this paper, especially in the theoretical section, we mainly focus on periods of excess
demand. When the Phillips curve is otherwise linear and only convex in regions of large
excess demand, this would imply that the sacrice ratio is higher during periods of excess
supply than the output gains of ination during excess demand periods.3 Such a convex
Phillips curve is illustrated in Figure 1. Hence, this would give a rationale for central banks
to ght ination more aggressively during periods of overheating, as the gains in terms of
output of allowing for higher ination are lower than the cost of bringing ination back to
the target. This would imply that asymmetric policy rules for convex Phillips curves, as
proposed by Schaling (2004), are appropriate for monetary policy making.
However, what matters for policy conclusions is also the shape of the curve during
periods of excess supply, because this is the measure of the cost of bringing ination back
to the target in terms of output. Hence, an additional important question is: How much
output has to be sacriced to reduce ination? Theoretically, there is no clear cut answer
to this question. On the one hand, output costs of bringing ination down might be high
because of downward nominal price rigidity (Akerlof et al., 1996). On the other hand,
output costs might be low: A theoretical model put forward by Stiglitz (1984) shows
3The sacrice ratio is dened as the cost of disination in terms of output.
4that, in monopolistically competitive markets, rms are less threatened by the entry of
potential competitors in a recession and hence charge higher prices than they do during
boom phases. In expansions, the rms in the market keep prices down to avoid the entrance
of competitors. Therefore, the price level is less sensitive to a positive shock to demand
than to a negative shock. Such pricing behaviour would imply that the Phillips curve is
concave. In the empirical part of this paper, we therefore also analyse the impact of demand
constraints on prices at the rm level. We nd that the presence of such constraints has a
strong impact on prices. Firms are more likely to decrease prices and less likely to increase
prices under demand constraints - the probability of a price reduction is roughly 60 percent
higher, holding all other variables at their average. These ndings suggest that the output
costs of reducing ination are relatively low. Hence, we nd both higher responsiveness
in prices to capacity constraints and to demand constraints, compared to situations when
rms are not faced with constraints. At the macro level, this implies that the Phillips curve
is steeper during periods of high real activity and steeper during periods of very low real
activity. When looking at the Phillips curve in a traditional diagram with excess supply
and excess demand plotted against the left and right-hand side of the x-axis, respectively,
and the change in ination on the y-axis, the shape of the Phillips curve is convex-concave,
a result also shown in Filardo (1998). Such a Phillips curve is illustrated in Figure 2. In
this kind of economy, a convexity exists at high levels of capacity utilisation, where many
rms are faced with capacity constraints. Nevertheless, due to concavity in a situation of
excess supply, reducing ination once it deviates from the target is not that costly in terms
of output.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briey summarises the
literature on the capacity constraint model and non-linear Phillips curves. In Section 3, a
theoretical model is described. Section 4 gives details about the data and the methodology
used for the empirical analysis, Section 5 presents the estimation results, Section 6 conducts
5robustness checks and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The rate of capacity utilisation has long been recognised as an explanatory variable for
ination. Many studies have ascertained the predictive power of the degree of capacity
utilisation for forecasting ination. For example, Stock and Watson (1999) report that
capacity utilisation outperforms the traditional measure of unemployment as a predictor
of ination in a Phillips curve estimation. Theoretical models that link the degree of
capacity utilisation to ination include, amongst others, Greenwood et al. (1988), Burnside
et al. (1993), and Cooley et al. (1995). These models, however, do not consider situations
of capacity constraints, mainly for practical reasons. Nevertheless, capacity constraints
are important: if rms operate near their capacity constraint, any increase in demand
can hardly be met by increased production. As such, in the short run, the increase in
demand translates almost uniquely into an increase in prices. Hence, at the macro level,
in a situation where many rms operate close to their capacity constraint, a relatively
small aggregate demand shock would lead to a large increase ination. Thus, the Phillips
curve is almost vertical near the level of economic activity where all rms are capacity
constrained, where the slope becomes gradually steeper as the economy moves in the
direction of the (aggregate) capacity constraint. The capacity constraint model implies
a vertical asymptote in the Phillips curve at the capacity constraint (De Veirman, 2007).
Such a convex short-run Phillips curve under capacity constraints is illustrated in Figure
1.
Several studies tested for non-linearity in the Phillips curve employing macro data, i.e.
data on ination and measures of real economic activity. However, no consensus seems to










excess demand excess supply CC
Figure 1: A convex Phillips curve under the capacity constraint hypothesis.
CC denotes the point where all rms in the economy are capacity constrained.
ploys a kinked specication of the Phillips curve equation for the G7 countries individually,
and nds signicant asymmetric eects from the output gap, with inationary eects of
positive gaps being larger than the deationary eects of negative gaps for Canada, Japan,
and the US. Notably, he cannot reject the linear model for the European countries, France
and Germany. Clark et al. (1996) also estimate a kinked line for the US Phillips curve.
They found evidence for convexity in US data from 1964 to 1990. Laxton et al. (1995)
and Clark et al. (1996, 2001) include a quadratic term of the output gap in their Phillips
curve specication and nd support for convexity. By contrast, Gordon (1997) rejects the
hypothesis of non-linearity for the US data over the period 1955 to 1996. Filardo (1998)
concludes that the Phillips curve is convex-concave with ination accelerating faster dur-
ing periods of strong excess demand, a moderate acceleration of ination during periods of
moderate real activity and a stronger decline of ination during periods of excess supply.
Figure 2 illustrates such a short-run convex-concave Phillips curve.
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Figure 2: A convex-concave Phillips curve under the capacity constraint hypothesis with
demand constraints.
CC denotes the point where all rms in the economy are capacity constrained, CD the point where all rms are demand
constrained.
mainly due to the fact that it has not been possible to directly observe the presence of
capacity constraints. This paper lls this gap by employing micro data that contain such
direct information, so that tests for the capacity constraint hypothesis can be carried out.
3 The Model
In this section, we describe the theoretical model developed by  Alvarez Lois (2004), which
shows that a convex Phillips curve can exist if rms are faced with capacity constraints.
First, following Fagnart et al. (1999), it is shown that the assumption of the existence of
capacity constraints and demand uncertainty allows for dierences in capacity utilisation
across rms. Second, the production side of this economy is combined with a sticky price
assumption. The result is that the dynamics of ination depend on the distribution of
constraints across rms in the economy. A New Keynesian-type Phillips curve is derived
8that exhibits a convex shape if capacity constraints are present.4 We present the  Alvarez-
Lois model to obtain a testable price-setting equation for our empirical model.
The economy is described by an intermediate goods producing sector and a nal goods
producing sector. The intermediate goods sector is characterised by monopolistic compe-
tition whereas the nal goods sector operates in a competitive environment. Idiosyncratic
demand uncertainty in the intermediate goods sector introduces heterogeneity, which de-
termines the degree of capacity utilisation in equilibrium.5
3.1 Final Goods Producers
Final goods are produced by employing a continuum of intermediate goods, j 2 [0;1]. The
nal goods Y at time t are produced by a representative rm in a perfectly competitive













where Yj;t is the intermediate good j used in production and j;t > 0 is the productivity
parameter of input j, which is assumed to be i.i.d. distributed across input rms and
to be serially uncorrelated.  represents the elasticity of substitution. The distribution
function F() with unit mean and variance  is dened over the support [0;1) and is
assumed to be log normal. The representative nal goods producer purchases inputs in
the intermediate goods sector. The total supply of input j is limited to an amount  Yj;t,
equal to the maximum productive capacity of the corresponding input supplying rm.
4Another theoretical microfoundation for such a relationship is given in the capacity constraint model of
Evans (1985). This model relies upon the assumption that rms nd it dicult to increase their production
capacity in the short run. Due to bottlenecks in the production process, ination accelerates more during
periods of high aggregate demand than during periods of low demand. Hence, the model also implies a
convex short-run aggregate supply/Phillips curve.
5We model the production side of the economy only, as the eect of capacity constraints on price
adjustments is the main focus of the empirical part of this paper. A fully edged general equilibrium
model can be found in  Alvarez Lois (2006).
9Intermediate rms operate in a market with monopolistic competition with sticky prices.
Thus, if they are not constrained, intermediate goods producers satisfy demand at posted
prices. Prices are readjusted in a Calvo-type fashion. If the capacity constraint is binding
for intermediate goods producers, they sell only the maximum quantity they can supply
( Yj;t), and thus do not satisfy all demand. Thus, there is rationing, and the quantity sold
is lower than demand for the intermediate product at the posted price. The maximisation
problem of intermediate goods producers will be discussed more thoroughly in the following
section.
The nal goods producer knows input prices fPj;tg, the supply constraints  Yj;t and
the realisations of the productivity parameter fj;tg. The nal goods producer, who does
not face uncertainty, maximises prots subject to the supply constraints in intermediate







subject to Yj;t <  Yj;t;8j 2 [0;1]. Pt is the nal goods price and Yt is dened by equation
(1).







Pt )  if j;t  ~ j;t
 Yj;t if j;t  ~ j;t
(3)
which determine demand for the intermediate good j at time t. The Appendix provides






represents the critical value of the productivity shock for which the unconstrained demand
10equals the maximum supply  Yj;t.
As intermediate good producers are identical ex ante,  Yj;t = Yt, Pj;t = Pt and there
is symmetry in capacities and prices. The latter implies that ~ j;t is identical across all





















This expression follows from the fact that the productivity shock is below e t for a
proportion F(e t) of inputs, which therefore are not supply-constrained. The proportion
1 F(e t) is above e t and therefore is supply-constrained, purchasing only a quantity of Yt
of the intermediate good.
3.2 Intermediate Inputs Sector
The intermediate-goods sector is characterised by monopolistic competition. Prices are
adjusted according to a Calvo-pricing rule. Each rm may reset its price only with prob-
ability 1    in any given period. Firms are assumed to set their prices before they know
the realisation of the demand shock, i.e. intermediate goods producers start with a prede-
termined level of capacity at time t.6 This uncertainty implies that all rms that receive
the Calvo signal in period t set the same price P 











t   MCt+k]g (6)
subject to the expected demand from nal goods producers
6We assume that it is not possible for intermediate goods producers to maintain falsely that they are

















where t+k corresponds to the stochastic discount factor for nominal payos7 and
MCt+k 
Wt+k
At+k is the marginal cost of production with Wt+k being the nominal wage and
At+k the productivity measure from the Cobb-Douglas production function. Expected
demand for the intermediate good in period t + k is denoted by Y int
t+k. Note that all
intermediate input rms are ex ante identical and therefore set the same price P 
t , thus we
drop the index j. Expected demand is simply a result of the demand for the intermediate
good dened by equation (3), weighted by the probability distribution of the productivity
shock. Recall that F() is the probability distribution of the productivity shock. Thus, for
a proportion F(e ) of intermediate rms, the realised value of the productivity parameter
is below e .






























is the probability that a rm that sets its price in t is faced with a demand in period t+k
that is smaller than the productive capacity of the given rm. Or, in other words, the
probability that a rm is not constrained. The Appendix provides more details on the
7In a general equilibrium setting, the stochastic discount factor corresponds to the representative house-
hold's relative valuation of cash across time. The subscript t + 1 takes into account the fact that share-
holders of rms (households) can use the cash to buy consumption goods. As we focus on the Phillips
curve relationship here, we do not explicitly model the consumption side of the economy. See  Alvarez Lois
(2000).
12derivation of equation (8). Hence, 1    (e int
t+k) is a measure for the share of intermediate
goods producers that are faced with stronger demand than their actual production capacity
supplies.
For log-linearisation around the steady state, the exible price (i.e. for  = 0) and the
optimal price without constraints (i.e. 1    (e int

















3.3 The Phillips Curve
Log-linearizing the rst order condition (8) around the steady state yields
b P







t+k + c mct+k + b Pt] (12)
where b c




t+k) 1 and variables denoted with \b"
are written in terms of their percentage deviation from steady state. c mct+k is the log of
the average real marginal cost, that is
c mct+k = c Wt   b Pt   b zt (13)
with b zt  log(At
A ).
Solving equation (12) forward yields
b P

t = (1   )[
c
t + c mct + b Pt] + ()b P

t+1: (14)
13This is a central equation of the model as it relates the price-adjustment decision of rms
to the capacity constraints the rms are currently faced with. This is the equation we are
going to take to the data in the empirical part of the paper. Before doing so, we show that
this model implies a convex Phillips curve at the aggregate level if capacity constraints are
present.
Given that a share of  rms updates the price in a given period, the aggregate input
price index evolves according to
Pt = [P
1 






or in log-linear form
b Pt =  b Pt 1 + (1   )b P

t : (16)
Combining price setting with aggregate price dynamics yields the Phillips curve
t = Ett+1 + (b 
c




In this expression the ination rate depends not only on the deviation of marginal
cost from steady state but also on the term b c
t, which measures the share of rms in the
economy that operate at full capacity. Presumably, in reality such capacity constraints are
more likely to arise during periods of strong aggregate demand. Hence, at the macro level,
during periods of high real activity, more and more rms are capacity constrained, i.e. the
term b c
t becomes > 0 and thereby puts additional upward pressure on ination.
The implications of this kind of convex Phillips curve for macroeconomic policy would
provide the motivation for stabilising output around its potential and avoiding larger de-
viations from it. Monetary policymakers need to be more aggressive in ghting ination
14during periods of strong excess demand, as bringing ination back to the initial level is
more costly than the benets from the initial increase. Therefore, monetary policy has to
be more forward-looking and it is more important to be aware of the current state of the
business cycle.
It should be noted here that we employ the  Alvarez-Lois model as a workhorse, showing
how capacity constraints can arise and feed through to ination theoretically. Directly
relating the data employed here to the model has some shortcomings that need to be
borne in mind. In particular, Calvo pricing is assumed, because making price adjustments
state-dependent yields very complicated dynamics that are far beyond the scope of this
paper. Nevertheless, we would like to mention that state-dependent adjustments would
yield a theoretical model that could be related more directly to the data employed here, as
this would make it possible to relate the presence of capacity constraints to the frequency
of price adjustments. The contribution of this paper is clearly in the application of micro
data that allow for the observation of both price adjustments and capacity constraints at
the rm level. Hence, in the empirical section, we test the validity of the assumption that
rms' price setting behaviour takes capacity constraints into account. Furthermore we look
at the eect of demand constraints and analyse whether we nd more downward pressure
on prices during those periods, to test for downward rigidity. Hence, Calvo pricing is a
simplication to make the theoretical model tractable. In the empirical section, we take
into account state-dependent pricing.
4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Data
For our analysis we use rm level micro data. The data source is a quarterly business-
tendency survey in the manufacturing industry as conducted by the KOF Swiss Economic
15Institute. For our estimations we employ all observations from 1999 onwards, because
the information on the presence of constraints is available only since then (see below).
The estimation sample therefore consists of 25;608 observations of 1;966 rms in an un-
balanced panel. Relating to prices, there are several qualitative questions in the survey.
Firms are asked whether their selling prices (i) have been changed in the previous three
months (denoted by Sellingpriceit for rm i at period t), and (ii) whether they will be
changed in the following three months, Et(Sellingpricei;t+1). The answering options on
both questions are increase (+1), decrease (-1) or left unchanged (0), whereas a non-
response is treated as missing value. Relating to capacity utilisation, the rms are asked
to quantify the capacity utilisation (Utilisationit) within the past three months in per-
centage points, with the rms able to choose from a range of 50% to 110% in ve percent
steps.8 From the latter we can calculate the percentage change in production capacity
from t   1 to t (Change in Utilisationit 1;t). We control for the change in utilisation,
as it is likely that rms undertake utilisation adjustments in response to shocks as an
alternative to price adjustments (e.g. Andersen and Toulemonde, 2004). For example,
M uller and K oberl (2007) show that changes in capacity utilisation rates are used as an
adjustment mechanism in response to demand shocks. From 1999 onwards, the survey also
includes qualitative questions about production barriers. Firms can indicate whether they
are restricted by constraints. Namely, unsatisfactory demand (Demandconstraintit), or
one of two types of capacity constraints, which are (i) capacity constraints due to insu-
cient technical capacities (TechnicalCapconstraintit)9 and (ii) capacity constraints due to
8In the survey questionnaire, it is stated that capacity utilisation is dened as physical capacity alone:
Buildings, plant, machinery, vehicles etc. Firms are asked to dene a capacity utilisation of 100 percent as
a situation where they use all their capital during general working hours and the usual number of shifts.
A situation where rms claim above 100 percent utilisation may thus be given in the case when rms use
all their capital for more than the usual working hours, or when all capital is used with an additional shift.
9The survey questionnaire states that rms should indicate if their production is constrained, and, if
so, whether it is due to the shortage of technical capacity, such as machines, vehicles etc.
16labour shortage10 (LabourCapconstraintit)(amongst others not considered in this paper).
Hence, TechnicalCapconstraintit and LabourCapconstraintit are proxies for the presence
of short-run capacity constraints. Demandconstraintit is the indicator for demand con-
straints.11
Obtaining a measure of the deviation of a rm's current utilisation from a value that is
regarded as \normal" can be challenging. It is a common practice to employ the long-term
average of capacity utilisation as the natural rate. However, dierent rms display quite
dierent long-term averages of utilisation rates. The distribution of long-term utilisation
rates across rms, i.e. the average of all observations, by rm, over the estimation sample, is
shown in Figure 3. In Figures 4 and 5, we plot the distribution of capacity utilisation rates
of rms, conditioning on a restriction in technical capacities and labour supply, respectively.
As can be seen, the distribution becomes more left skewed, with more rms operating at
higher capacity utilisation rates. This is theoretically plausible, as rms should stretch their
utilisation rates as far as possible when faced with strong demand. Also, the distribution
of capacity utilisation rates under demand constraints is theoretically plausible. As shown
in Figure 6, the distribution is slightly right skewed, indicating that rms that are faced
with demand constraints have already reduced capacity utilisation rates. One feature that
becomes apparent in all graphs is that not all rms necessarily operate at high capacity
utilisation when they indicate that they are faced with capacity constraints. A substantial
proportion of capacity-constrained rms operates at 85 percent and below. For example,
rms with only one to 49 employees have an average utilisation of 81.4 percent, whereas
rms with more than 200 employees show an average utilisation of 85.8 percent. It is thus
not always accurate to assume that capacity constraints arise only at very high utilisation
rates. Also demand-constrained rms do not necessarily operate at very low utilisation
10The survey questionnaire states that rms should indicate if their production is constrained, and, if
so, whether it is due to the shortage of labour.
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Average utilisation rates by firm
Figure 3: Discrete distribution of average capacity utilisation rates across rms over time.
Source: KOF Quarterly Industry Survey.
rates. This again corroborates the motivation for this paper to employ directly observable
constraint indicators from micro data in order to examine the relationship to prices.
We therefore use the deviation of a rm's current from its rm-specic long-term average
utilisation as a proxy for the deviation from steady state utilisation. For calculating the












where Ui;t is the capacity utilisation rate of rm i at time t. As a consequence of rms
answering on a voluntary basis, the observations for each rm are not uninterrupted over
time. Hence, we have an unbalanced panel and therefore use the index  instead of t in
12Note that if there are structural breaks at the rm level, such an \average" may be an insucient
measure. As the main purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of constraints, we abstract from the
case that structural breaks at the rm level exist. We take a more careful look at the utilisation rate that
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Utilisation rates under technical capacity constraints
Figure 4: Discrete distribution of utilisation rates under technical capacity constraints.
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Utilisation rates under labour supply constraints
Figure 5: Discrete distribution of utilisation rates under capacity constraints due to short-
age of labour.
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Utilisation rates under demand constraints
Figure 6: Discrete distribution of utilisation rates under demand constraints.
Source: KOF Quarterly Industry Survey.
the summation. The number of responding rms in each quarter uctuates between 897
and 1;335.13
The average price increases and decreases in the previous quarter over time can be
found in Figure 7. Price increases usually display spikes in the rst quarter of each year.
This observation is relatively standard in the empirical price-setting literature and is a form
of Taylor pricing, where rms re-set their prices in regular intervals. The relatively large
share of price increases in the rst quarter 2001 is due to an increase in the rate of value
added tax (VAT). Price decreases, on the other hand, do not appear to display seasonality.
Furthermore, during the period from the second quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter
of 2005, we observe more price reductions than increases. As producer price ination
13We had the choice to either use an unbalanced panel and allow for uctuations in the number of
responding rms or to restrict the sample to rms that respond each quarter over the entire sample. The
latter would leave us with a much lower number of observations. We therefore opted to use the unbalanced
panel. However, we analysed the issue of uctuations of respondents more thoroughly than reported here
and we did not nd that restricting the sample to a share of rms that respond regularly (and therefore
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Figure 7: Percentage share of price increases and decreases in the previous quarter, over
time.
Source: KOF Quarterly Industry Survey.
in Switzerland was only at 0.4 percent on average during that period, such a picture is
plausible.
Figure 8 shows the price increases and decreases that are expected by rms for the
upcoming quarter of each survey period. For expected price increases, a similar picture
arises. The large spike in the last quarter of 2000 is likely to be driven by the expected
increase in VAT rates in 2001.
A further survey description is given in Table 9 in the Appendix. Summary statistics
of the estimation sample are provided in Table 10.
4.2 Methodology
The main assumption in the theoretical model that we would like to test is whether rms
set prices by taking into account capacity constraints and real marginal cost (equation
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Figure 8: Percentage share of expected price increases and decreases in the forthcoming
quarter, over time.
Source: KOF Quarterly Industry Survey.
variables: First, the capacity constraints rms are faced with, and, second, a measure of
the deviation of real marginal cost from steady state. For the former we employ the binary
variable indicating a capacity constraint, whereas for the latter we employ the capacity
utilisation gap dened in equation 18 as a proxy.
The dependent binary variable yit is dened as 1 if the price of the product produced
by rm i has increased in the last three months and zero otherwise
y
+
it = 1 if Selling priceit = 1 (19)
y
+
it = 0 otherwise: (20)
We follow Rupprecht (2007) and distinguish between price increases and decreases to
investigate whether asymmetries play a role in price-setting behaviour, i.e. whether price
22increases behave dierently than price decreases in response to the explanatory variables.
For modelling price reductions, the dependent variable is then dened as
y
 
it = 1 if Selling priceit =  1 (21)
y
 
it = 0 otherwise: (22)
We use the conditional logit model, where the probability that rm i changes its price
in period t is given by






xit are the explanatory variables at time t for rm i. yi is the average of observed price
adjustments conducted by rm i. As explanatory variables we include
 Gapi;t: The capacity utilisation gap as dened in (18) serves as indicator for real
activity (or, in terms of the New Keynesian model, the proxy for the deviation of
real marginal cost from their steady state value).
 Change in Utilis: The percentage change of capacity utilisation (Ui;t  Ui;t 1)=Ui;t 1.
 Winter, spring, summer: Seasonal dummies for the rst, second and third quarter
of the year.14
 TechnicalCapconstraint: a binary variable that is one if the rm indicates that it is
constrained in capacity due to constraints in technical capacities, and zero otherwise.
 LabourCapconstraint: a binary variable that is one if the rm indicates that it is
constrained in capacity due to shortage of labour, and zero otherwise.
14It has been shown in previous studies on price setting that price increases, in particular, display
seasonality, see Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Rupprecht (2007).
23 DemandConstraint: a binary variable that is one if the rm indicates that it is
constrained in demand, and zero otherwise.
 Time-xed eects: we include a dummy for each year which we do not report here.15
We also include dummies that control for changes in VAT rates.
We employ the conditional logit model as proposed by Chamberlain (1980) to control
for unobserved heterogeneity. The basic intuition is that the individual xed eects are
computed by the average number of events (yit = 1) for a given rm.16 The coecient
vector  is then estimated, conditional on all individual eects. This also implies that the
number of observations drops in the estimations. Firms that display only price adjustments
or no price adjustments in the entire sample drop out of the estimation, because these rms'
contribution to the log-likelihood is zero.
5 Results
The results for the estimations with current price increases as dependent variable are re-
ported in columns one to ve of Table 1. We report marginal eects, assuming all other
variables are at their sample mean and the xed eects are at zero. Accordingly, we condi-
tion all interpretations henceforth on these assumptions, without explicitly stating them.
In the rst column we add only the measure for the capacity utilisation gap, the change
in utilisation, the seasonal dummies and year xed eects (which are not reported here).
As noted in the previous section, the number of observations is determined by the num-
15We also tested whether including a dummy for each quarter and excluding the seasonal dummies yields
dierent results. There are substantial dierences in the size of coecients for the time dummies, which
is plausible when looking at the data. However, the marginal eects of interest (the eects of constraints
and the utilisation gap) are not largely dierent and the conclusions are still the same. We opted to report
the results for estimation including the seasonal dummies plus annual xed eects here.
16Full maximum likelihood would yield inconsistent estimates of  and the individual xed eects.





24ber of rms where we observe at least one period with a price increase and at least one
period without price increase. We nd, as expected, a positive and statistically signicant
relationship between the capacity utilisation gap and price increases. The marginal eect
is 0.38. This implies that an increase in the utilisation gap from its mean by one stan-
dard deviation (0.07) increases the probability of a price change by roughly three percent.
This estimate seems reasonable. The marginal eect of the change in utilisation is -0.07,
implying that an increase in the utilisation rate by one percent reduces the probability of
observing a price increase by 7 percent. The negative sign indicates that rms that have
recently adjusted capacities are less likely to adjust prices. However, the eect is insignif-
icant. Furthermore, seasonality plays a role for price setting. In the rst quarter of the
year, the probability of observing a price increase is 16 percent higher than during the last
quarter of the year.
In column two, we add the two indicators for capacity constraints and the indicator
for demand constraints. A capacity constraint due to restrictions in technical capacities
increases the probability of observing a price increase by six percent, compared to a situa-
tion without restrictions in technical capacities. This is a signicant and meaningful eect.
The impact of capacity constraints due to shortages of labour has an even larger eect:
compared to a situation without labour shortage, the probability of observing a price in-
crease is ten percent higher when a rm indicates a labour supply constraint. Moreover,
demand constraints have a signicant eect. As expected, the sign is negative, and the
marginal eect is estimated to be around -0.1. Hence, the probability of observing a price
increase is about ten percent lower when faced with a demand constraint, compared to a
situation without demand constraint. The marginal eect of the utilisation gap remains
about the same. The change in utilisation remains insignicant. The marginal eects of
the seasonal dummies remain almost identical.
In column three, we split the capacity utilisation gap and consider positive and negative
25Table 1: Current price increases
Dependent variable: price increases
Capacity Utilis Gap 0.3812*** 0.2479***
(0.0725) (0.0788)
% Change in Utilis -0.0766 -0.0612 -0.0651 -0.0667 -0.0628
(0.0584) (0.0646) (0.0656) (0.0660) (0.0660)
Winter 0.1614*** 0.1552*** 0.1577*** 0.1585*** 0.1585***
(0.0195) (0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155)
Spring 0.0069 0.0008 0.0006 0.0005 0.0008
(0.0173) (0.0190) (0.0192) (0.0193) (0.0193)
Summer -0.0253 -0.0349* -0.0359* -0.0355* -0.0352*
(0.0170) (0.0205) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0208)
TechnicalCapconstraint 0.0602** 0.0637** 0.0236 0.0621**
(0.0267) (0.0272) (0.0391) (0.0275)
LabourCapconstraint 0.1034*** 0.1066*** 0.1069*** 0.0780***
(0.0203) (0.0208) (0.0210) (0.0285)
DemandConstraint -0.1029*** -0.1031*** -0.1047*** -0.1044***
(0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0206)
Capacity Utilis Gap+ 0.1194 0.0519 0.0323
(0.1301) (0.1385) (0.1424)
Capacity Utilis Gap  -0.4136*** -0.4318*** -0.4316***
(0.1558) (0.1574) (0.1573)
Gap+ * TechnConstr 0.5289
(0.3310)
Gap+ * LabourConstr 0.4734*
(0.2872)
Observations 11098 11098 11098 11098 11098
Number of id 669 669 669 669 669
Pseudo R-squared 0.090 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Wald p-value 0.20 0.12 0.10
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. The conditional
logit is estimated using time dummies for every year (not reported here). Marginal eects
are reported holding all other variables at the sample mean. The marginal eect of binary
variables is the marginal eect for a discrete change from zero to one. Gap+ * Techn-
Constr denotes an interaction term of Capacity Utilis Gap+ and TechnicalCapconstraint.
Analogously, Gap+ * LabourConstr is the interaction of Capacity Utilis Gap+ and Labour-
Capconstraint. The last row provides p-values of the Wald test of the hypothesis that the
absolute value of the coecients on Gap+ and Gap  are equal.
26Table 2: Expect price increase
Dependent variable: expected price increases
Capacity Utilis Gap 0.3015*** 0.1858***
(0.0613) (0.0625)
% Change in Utilis -0.0409 -0.0208 -0.0218 -0.0218 -0.0218
(0.0499) (0.0506) (0.0502) (0.0502) (0.0502)
Winter -0.1882*** -0.1917*** -0.1900*** -0.1900*** -0.1899***
(0.0107) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Spring -0.2365*** -0.2441*** -0.2419*** -0.2420*** -0.2418***
(0.0133) (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127)
Summer -0.1796*** -0.1864*** -0.1849*** -0.1850*** -0.1848***
(0.0119) (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111)
TechnicalCapconstraint 0.0365 0.0375 0.0394 0.0374
(0.0253) (0.0252) (0.0332) (0.0252)
LabourCapconstraint 0.0996*** 0.0994*** 0.0995*** 0.0982***
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0272)
DemandConstraint -0.0595*** -0.0586*** -0.0586*** -0.0586***
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134)
Capacity Utilis Gap+ 0.1320 0.1348 0.1292
(0.1018) (0.1067) (0.1089)
Capacity Utilis Gap  -0.2479** -0.2473** -0.2483**
(0.1121) (0.1123) (0.1122)
Gap+ * TechnConstr -0.0228
(0.2538)
Gap+ * LabourConstr 0.0162
(0.2232)
Observations 14213 14213 14213 14213 14213
Number of id 868 868 868 868 868
Pseudo R-squared 0.121 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127
Wald p-value 0.44 0.39 0.43
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. The conditional
logit is estimated using time dummies for every year. Marginal eects are reported holding
all other variables at the sample mean. The marginal eect of binary variables is the mar-
ginal eect for a discrete change from zero to one. Capacity Utilis Gap+ * TechnConstr
denotes an interaction term of Capacity Utilis Gap+ and TechnicalCapconstraint. Analo-
gously, Capacity Utilis Gap+ * LabourConstr is the interaction of Capacity Utilis Gap+ and
LabourCapconstraint. The last row provides p-values of the Wald test of the hypothesis
that the absolute value of the coecients on Gap+ and Gap  are equal.
27utilisation gaps separately. Following the literature on convexity of the Phillips curve, we
distinguish situations of excess demand (positive gap) and excess supply (negative gap)
and thereby examine whether the eect of a positive gap on prices is dierent to the eect
of a negative gap. Using this approach we allow the relationships between price increases
and the capacity utilisation gap to dier, depending on the sign of the gap. This approach
is commonly used in the literature to estimate a kinked Phillips curve using time series data
(e.g. Laxton et al., 1999). In this paper, we produce comparable micro data estimates of the
relationship between the gap and the probability of observing a price change.17 The eects
of the constraints remain almost equal to those reported in column two. A positive gap has
no signicant impact on the probability of observing a price increase after controlling for
the presence of capacity constraints. As the correlation is positive but not too large, this
result is not likely to be driven by multicollinearity. The tetrachoric correlation coecients
can be found in Table 11 in the Appendix.18 Our assumption is, rather, that the denition
of the gap measure as the deviation from the long-term average is not appropriate. We
have therefore replaced the capacity utilisation gap with alternative proxies for marginal
costs in the robustness section below.
The marginal eect of a negative capacity utilisation gap is -0.41, which is almost the
eect that we nd when we include capacity utilisation as a linear term. We also test
whether the absolute values of the coecients for Gap+ and Gap  are identical, the p-
values for the Wald tests are reported in the last row of each Table. We cannot reject
the null of equality of these coecients. Hence, these values are not statistically dierent
from each other. This nding suggests that we cannot reject the linearity hypothesis in the
17Note that this functional form still nests the possibility that the relationship is linear, if the two slopes
are identical in absolute terms. Furthermore, such an approach assumes that the break in the relationship
between prices and the utilisation gap is at the utilisation gap of zero, an assumption that is rather ad
hoc and not justied by any theoretical consideration, as the eect of constraints are likely to arise at
situations of unusually strong excess demand.
18The tetrachoric correlation is used to estimate the Pearson product-moment correlation between two
continuous, bivariate-normally distributed variables from dichotomized versions of those variables. See
Kirk (1973).
28relationship between the capacity utilisation gap and price adjustments, after controlling
for constraints. However, the interaction of constraints and the size of the utilisation
gap may be important here. We would therefore like to evaluate whether inationary
pressures are present when we observe constraints alone, or when we observe high levels of
utilisation, or when we observe high levels of utilisation and constraints at the same time.
By introducing interaction terms between the utilisation gap and the constraints, we are
able to estimate whether the eect depends on the size of the utilisation gap.
In the fourth and fth columns, we therefore include interaction terms of the size of
the positive gap and the technical capacity constraints and the positive gap and the labour
constraint, respectively. The interaction term between the positive gap and the technical
constraint appears to be insignicant. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the
interaction term is insignicant, as the usual t-test cannot be applied to interaction terms in
non-linear models. Instead, the interaction eect requires computing the cross derivative of
the expected value of the dependent variable. Like the marginal eect of a single variable,
the magnitude of the interaction eect depends on all the covariates in the model. In
addition, it can have dierent signs for dierent observations, making simple summary
measures of the interaction eect dicult. In particular, the sign may be dierent for
dierent values of the covariates, a fact that has been ignored by most applied researchers
(Ai and Norton, 2003). As the magnitude and statistical signicance of the interaction term
varies by observation, we show the consistent estimates graphically in the Appendix, as
proposed by Norton et al. (2004). Figure 9 illustrates the marginal eect of the interaction
term in the fourth column as a function of the predicted probability of observing a price
increase. The marginal eect of the interaction term in column four remains insignicant
for all values, as shown in Figure 10, where we illustrate the z-statistic as a function of
the predicted probability. In Figure 11 we graph the interaction terms of the positive gap
and the labour constraint against the predicted probability of the dependent variable. The
29Table 3: Current price decrease
Dependent variable: price decrease
Capacity Utilis Gap -0.7755*** -0.7342***
(0.0778) (0.0741)
% Change in Utilis 0.0988** 0.0847 0.0871 0.0865
(0.0463) (0.0552) (0.0549) (0.0538)
Winter 0.0207* 0.0289* 0.0288* 0.0280*
(0.0124) (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0149)
Spring -0.0007 0.0046 0.0046 0.0048
(0.0130) (0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0152)
Summer -0.0085 -0.0071 -0.0068 -0.0066
(0.0133) (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0155)
TechnicalCapconstraint 0.0220 0.0202 0.0216
(0.0294) (0.0293) (0.0286)
LabourCapconstraint -0.1297*** -0.1300*** -0.1277***
(0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0290)
DemandConstraint 0.1320*** 0.1311*** 0.1536***
(0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0155)
Capacity Utilis Gap+ -0.6235*** -0.5614***
(0.1356) (0.1345)
Capacity Utilis Gap  0.8100*** 1.2115***
(0.1080) (0.1638)
Gap  * DemandConstr -0.5845***
(0.1841)
Observations 12528 12528 12528 12528
Number of id 813 813 813 813
Pseudo R-squared 0.084 0.096 0.096 0.097
Wald p-value 0.34 0.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. The conditional logit
is estimated using time dummies for every year. Marginal eects are reported holding all
other variables at the sample mean. The marginal eect of binary variables is the marginal
eect for a discrete change from zero to one. Capacity Utilis Gap  * DemandConstr
denotes an interaction term of Capacity Utilis Gap  and DemandConstraint. The last
row provides p-values of the Wald test of the hypothesis that the absolute value of the
coecients on Gap+ and Gap  are equal.
30Table 4: Expect price decrease
Dependent variable: expected price decrease
Capacity Utilis Gap -0.5016*** -0.4030***
(0.0804) (0.0871)
% Change in Utilis 0.0280 -0.0081 -0.0044 -0.0044
(0.0540) (0.0690) (0.0686) (0.0684)
Winter -0.0407** -0.0437** -0.0437** -0.0435**
(0.0170) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0196)
Spring -0.0344** -0.0341* -0.0341* -0.0339*
(0.0161) (0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0193)
Summer 0.0108 0.0184 0.0185 0.0184
(0.0142) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0180)
TechnicalCapconstraint -0.0437 -0.0467 -0.0457
(0.0394) (0.0394) (0.0393)
LabourCapconstraint -0.1319*** -0.1330*** -0.1326***
(0.0343) (0.0344) (0.0345)
DemandConstraint 0.1400*** 0.1392*** 0.1450***
(0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0197)
Capacity Utilis Gap+ -0.2471 -0.2312
(0.1614) (0.1628)
Capacity Utilis Gap  0.5138*** 0.6235***
(0.1304) (0.2187)
Gap  * DemandConstr -0.1474
(0.2381)
Observations 10873 10873 10873 10873
Number of id 693 693 693 693
Pseudo R-squared 0.077 0.089 0.089 0.089
Wald p-value 0.26 0.21
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. The conditional logit
is estimated using time dummies for every year. Marginal eects are reported holding all
other variables at the sample mean. The marginal eect of binary variables is the marginal
eect for a discrete change from zero to one. Capacity Utilis Gap  * DemandConstr
denotes an interaction term of Capacity Utilis Gap  and DemandConstraint. The last
row provides p-values of the Wald test of the hypothesis that the absolute value of the
coecients on Gap+ and Gap  are equal.
31interaction term varies between 0.1 and 0.45 and is signicant for some observations at the
ten percent signicance level, as shown in Figure 12. This nding suggests that especially
rms i situations where they are capacity constrained due to a shortage in labour and
already run at high capacity, experience price pressure. Again, the Wald tests do not
reject that the coecients of Gap+ and Gap  are equal in absolute terms. This suggests
that the relationship between utilisation gap and prices is not necessarily nonlinear by
itself, but that the nonlinearities some researchers observe are driven by the presence of
capacity constraints which, however, are not directly observable, and do not necessarily
arise at very high degrees of utilisation.
In Table 2 we report the results of our estimations for expected price increases, i.e. the
price increases that rms expect to conduct in the upcoming quarter. As previously, we
report in the rst column the marginal eects of seasonal dummies, the capacity utilisation
gap and the change in capacity utilisation. The marginal eect of the capacity utilisation
gap is slightly lower than we estimated for current price increases reported in Table 1.
Repeating the previous example, a rm that increases the capacity utilisation rate from its
mean by one standard deviation of the utilisation gap, raises the probability of expecting
a price increase in the next quarter by approximately 1.8 percent. This eect is not very
large. The eect of seasonal factors, though, is sizeable. Compared to the last quarter of
the year, the probability of observing an expected price increase is 19, 24, and 18 percent
lower in the survey periods winter, spring and summer, respectively. This is in line with
the results reported in Table 1, where we nd that price increases are signicantly more
likely during the rst quarter of the year. Hence, when analysing what rms expect for
the upcoming quarter, rms report their planned price increases for the rst quarter of the
year. Hence, it is more likely that we observe the response \we expect to increase our price
next quarter during the fourth quarter.
In the second column, we add the constraint indicators. The constraint of technical
32capacities is insignicant. The constraint on labour supply shows a signicant marginal
eect on the probability of observing an expected price increase, with a size of about 0.1.
Firms that are subject to a demand constraint are estimated to have a six percent lower
probability of reporting an expected price increase, compared to rms without a demand
constraint.
In column three, we proceed as in the previous table and split the capacity utilisation
gap into a positive and a negative gap. Our results show that again the negative gap has a
signicant impact and a marginal eect of -0.25, whereas the positive gap is insignicant
after including the constraints. However, again we cannot reject the equality, in absolute
values, of the positive and negative capacity utilisation gap coecients in any of the esti-
mates. The other results are largely unchanged, compared to current price increases.
The fourth column reports the model that includes an interaction term between the
positive gap measure and the technical capacity constraint. Compared to the estimates in
column three, the eects of constraints are almost unchanged. The marginal eect of the
interaction term is illustrated in Figure 13 and the z-statistics in Figure 14 show that the
marginal eects are insignicant for all observations.
In the last column we show the model including the interaction term for the positive
gap measure and the labour constraint. The marginal eects are plotted in Figure 15 with
the z-statistic reported in Figure 16. The latter shows that the interaction term is not
signicant throughout all observations.
As noted in the introduction, we also consider the eect of demand constraints on
the probability of observing a price reduction. We analyse whether price reductions are
as responsive to excess demand as price increases are to excess supply. Although demand
constraints do not arise in the theoretical model, their empirical interpretation is important.
They show how rms set prices in response to situations of excess supply and therefore have
important implications for the shape of the aggregate Phillips curve. If rms reduce prices
33aggressively in response to such demand constraints, the Phillips curve will be steeper in
regions of excess demand (concave).
Our results for price reductions are reported in Table 3. According to the estimates
shown in column one, the eect of a one standard deviation reduction in a rm's capacity
utilisation gap from the mean increases the probability of observing a price reduction by
about six percent. In line with previous literature, price reductions are much less seasonal
than price increases (e.g. Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008, for the US and Rupprecht, 2007,
for Switzerland). In the second column, we include the constraint indicators. Constraints in
technical capacities are insignicant, whereas the constraint in labour supply has a marginal
eect of about -0.13. Firms that experience a demand constraint have a thirteen percent
higher probability of reducing prices compared to rms without a demand constraint.
Splitting the capacity utilisation gap into a positive and negative gap (column three), we
observe that both are signicant. However, the absolute values of the marginal eects are
not signicantly dierent from each other. We interact the negative gap with the demand
constraint variable in column four. The marginal eect of the interaction terms is shown
in Figure 17, with the z-statistics in Figure 18. The marginal eect of the interaction term
is negative throughout and signicant for about half of the observations.
In Table 4 we report the model with expected price decreases as a dependent variable.
In column one, we include the capacity utilisation rate linearly. The marginal eect is
estimated to be -0.5. Following the previous example, this implies that a reduction of the
capacity utilisation gap from the mean by one standard deviation increases the probability
of expecting a price reduction by about four percent, a very similar result to that for current
price reductions. In the last quarter of the year, it is signicantly more likely that a rm
will expect a price reduction for the next quarter, than in the rst two quarters. However,
the seasonal eect is relatively small compared to the seasonality in price increases. Adding
the constraints in column two shows that a labour shortage reduces the probability of a
34price reduction by 13 percent. A demand constraint increases the probability by 14 percent.
In column three, we take account of possible non-linearity in the capacity utilisation-price
relationship by including the positive and the negative utilisation gap separately. Here,
only negative utilisation gaps are signicantly related to price reductions, with a marginal
eect of 0.51. Again, the Wald test, as described above, does not allow to reject equality
of the coecients in absolute terms. The results are almost unchanged when adding an
interaction between the negative gap and the demand constraint. The marginal eect of
the interaction term is insignicant for all observations (see Figures 19 and 18 for the
estimated marginal eects and consistent z-statistics, respectively).
All in all, our results show that we can conrm the theoretical prediction of the capacity
constraint model, which implies that capacity constraints trigger price increases. Both
constraints due to the shortage of labour and constraints due to technical constraints have a
positive marginal eect. We also show that price reductions are very responsive to demand
constraints, a negative utilisation gap, and the interaction of the two. However, we cannot
conrm that above-average capacity utilisation alone is an indicator for price pressure. This
also holds true for the interaction between a capacity constraint and a positive utilisation
gap. Only a utilisation gap above average and a labour supply constraint at the same time
produce signicant price pressure.
For the macro level, the implications of these results are twofold. First, even if util-
isation rates are above average this does not yet point to signicant price pressure. We
nd that simultaneous constraints to labour supply and positive utilisation gaps add sig-
nicantly to price pressure. Furthermore, the presence of capacity and labour supply
constraints alone is an indicator of inationary pressure. Hence, it might be worth mod-
eling such capacity constraints directly into Phillips curve relationships, in addition to an
indicator for the output gap. If available, this information might lead to better and more
reliable estimates empirically. Furthermore, prices are very responsive not only to capacity
35constraints but also to demand constraints. We observe a strong response of price reduc-
tions to low utilisation rates and demand constraints. This would imply that the Phillips
curve might even be convex-concave, rather than purely convex. Moreover, such shapes
may not be detectable when employing only measures of the capacity utilisation gap as
indicator in a Phillips curve estimation, as price increases react rather to constraints, which
are not perfectly correlated with utilisation rates.
6 Robustness
In this section, we conduct robustness checks using dierent control variables than the ones
we have used in the main section. Previously, we measured marginal cost as the deviation
of capacity utilisation from its rm-specic average. As this measure for marginal cost
is based upon utilisation, too, we use dierent proxies here. First, to capture marginal
cost, we switch to the variables E(Increasecost) and E(Decreasecost). Firms are asked
in the survey whether the cost for input products and raw materials have changed, and
whether they have increased or decreased. This may also yield a good proxy for marginal
cost. Unfortunately, wages or changes in wages are not covered in the survey. Second, we
include a proxy for competition. Firms are asked whether their competitive position in
the Swiss market has increased, decreased or remained unchanged. Thus, we construct a
binary variable that is equal to one (Competitive Position+=1) if the competitive position
has improved and zero otherwise. Competitive Position  is equal to one if the competitive
position has worsened and zero otherwise. It should be noted that these variables are crude
proxies for marginal costs or competition, and far from being perfect. However, they are
the best measures that are available on the micro level. Interestingly, the results for our
main variables of interest, the constraints, remain robust and the sizes of the marginal
eects are mostly in line with the ones reported in the main section. Table 5 presents
36the results for price increases in the quarter under review. The rst column shows the
results for the regression, including only the change in costs, the seasonal terms and the
time dummies. The second column adds the constraints. The third column reports results
for the model, including the costs, constraints and the proxies for competitive position.
As can be seen, the presence of a technical capacity constraint increases the probability
of observing a price increase in the current quarter by about ve percent. In the main
section, this estimate was marginally higher, at around six percent. The eects of the
labour constraint (around 10 percent) and the demand constraint (around -10 percent)
are also very close to the estimates in the main section, and the signs of the controls
are as expected. An expected increase in costs increases the probability of observing a
price increase by about 10 percent, an improvement in competitive position by about six
percent. The eect of the expected increase in costs appears relatively low. However, the
survey asks about an expected increase in cost in the upcoming quarter. If rms pass
through costs to prices only at the time costs change, this eect should become larger in
the upcoming quarter.19
Table 6 reports the results for expected price increases in the upcoming quarter. In
these regressions, the marginal eect of a rise in expected cost becomes much larger. An
increase in expected cost increases the probability of observing a price change by around 50
percent. Again, technical capacity constraints are insignicant after including all control
variables, comparable to the results in the main part. The presence of labour constraints
increases the probability of observing a price change by around 8 percent.
Tables 7 and 8 report the results for current and upcoming price decreases, respectively.
Analogously to the previous tables, the results for the main variables of interest are almost
unchanged. Interestingly, a worsening of the competitive position is associated with a
19There is evidence that rms in Switzerland pass through changes in value added taxes (which are
known to them well in advance) only at the time these changes become eective (Kaufmann, 2008). Thus,
it seems that rms do not adjust their prices in advance. This is also what we nd in this paper.
37substantially higher probability of reducing prices. The marginal eect is around 0.27 for
both current and expected price reductions.
Summing up, the results presented in the previous section are robust to the inclusion
of alternative control variables; both size and signicance of the marginal eects of the
constraints are almost unchanged.
38Table 5: Current price increases with alternative controls
Dependent variable: price increases
E(Increase cost) 0.1103*** 0.1061*** 0.0965***
(0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0120)












Winter 0.1624*** 0.1648*** 0.1409***
(0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0117)
Spring 0.0210 0.0143 0.0123
(0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0158)
Summer -0.0270* -0.0322** -0.0317*
(0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0176)
Observations 14092 14092 14092
Number of id 793 793 793
Pseudo R-squared 0.0907 0.102 0.104
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. The conditional
logit is estimated using time dummies for every year (not reported here). Marginal eects
are reported holding all other variables at the sample mean. The marginal eect of binary
variables is the marginal eect for a discrete change from zero to one. Competitive Position+
is equal to one if a rm indicates that its current competitive position in Switzerland
has improved, i.e. the competitive pressure from other rms is lower. Analogously, if a
rm indicates its current competitive position in Switzerland has worsened (Competitive
Position  = 1) then the competitive pressure from other rms is higher.
39Table 6: Expected price increases with alternative controls
Dependent variable: expected price increases
E(Increase cost) 0.5196*** 0.5170*** 0.4652***
(0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0170)












Winter -0.2195*** -0.2176*** -0.2128***
(0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0165)
Spring -0.2510*** -0.2569*** -0.2564***
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0176)
Summer -0.2004*** -0.2054*** -0.2008***
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0168)
Observations 17709 17709 17709
Number of id 1010 1010 1010
Pseudo R-squared 0.297 0.301 0.302
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. The conditional
logit is estimated using time dummies for every year (not reported here). Marginal eects
are reported holding all other variables at the sample mean. The marginal eect of binary
variables is the marginal eect for a discrete change from zero to one. Competitive Position+
is equal to one if a rm indicates that its current competitive position in Switzerland
has improved, i.e. the competitive pressure from other rms is lower. Analogously, if a
rm indicates its current competitive position in Switzerland has worsened (Competitive
Position  = 1) then the competitive pressure from other rms is higher.
40Table 7: Current price decreases with alternative controls
Dependent variable: price decreases
E(Increase cost) -0.0263** -0.0187* -0.0273**
(0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0139)












Winter 0.0521*** 0.0508*** 0.0740***
(0.0092) (0.0089) (0.0146)
Spring 0.0057 0.0095 0.0135
(0.0108) (0.0103) (0.0155)
Summer -0.0032 -0.0004 -0.0058
(0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0155)
Observations 16432 16432 16432
Number of id 990 990 990
Pseudo R-squared 0.0692 0.0929 0.120
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. The conditional
logit is estimated using time dummies for every year (not reported here). Marginal eects
are reported holding all other variables at the sample mean. The marginal eect of binary
variables is the marginal eect for a discrete change from zero to one. Competitive Position+
is equal to one if a rm indicates that its current competitive position in Switzerland
has improved, i.e. the competitive pressure from other rms is lower. Analogously, if a
rm indicates its current competitive position in Switzerland has worsened (Competitive
Position  = 1) then the competitive pressure from other rms is higher.
41Table 8: Expected price decreases with alternative controls
Dependent variable: expected price decreases
E(Increase cost) -0.0654*** -0.0564*** -0.0770***
(0.0160) (0.0154) (0.0175)












Winter -0.0026 -0.0000 -0.0074
(0.0137) (0.0132) (0.0181)
Spring -0.0327** -0.0265* -0.0422**
(0.0154) (0.0149) (0.0187)
Summer 0.0177 0.0197 0.0191
(0.0132) (0.0128) (0.0184)
Observations 13986 13986 13986
Number of id 819 819 819
Pseudo R-squared 0.168 0.186 0.210
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. The conditional
logit is estimated using time dummies for every year (not reported here). Marginal eects
are reported holding all other variables at the sample mean. The marginal eect of binary
variables is the marginal eect for a discrete change from zero to one. Competitive Position+
is equal to one if a rm indicates that its current competitive position in Switzerland
has improved, i.e. the competitive pressure from other rms is lower. Analogously, if a
rm indicates its current competitive position in Switzerland has worsened (Competitive
Position  = 1) then the competitive pressure from other rms is higher.
427 Conclusions
This paper investigates the role of capacity utilisation and capacity constraints for the
price-setting behaviour of rms. We show in a theoretical model that capacity constraints
at the rm level enter into the price-setting decision, making prices dependent on marginal
cost and a measure of the distribution of rms in the economy that are faced with capacity
constraints. Using a unique panel dataset of quarterly data of manufacturing rm business
tendency surveys from 1999-2007 for Switzerland, we empirically analyse the role of dier-
ent capacity constraints for the pricing behaviour of rms. We nd that, as expected, rms
with a high level of capacity utilisation are generally more likely to increase and less likely
to decrease prices. We conclude that the relationship between capacity utilisation and
prices conrms the prediction of the theoretical model: when rms are faced with capacity
constraints, they are more likely to raise prices. We furthermore nd that price reductions
are very responsive to reductions in capacity utilisation rates and demand constraints. Our
results therefore suggest that, at the macro level, ination accelerates more quickly during
periods of substantial excess demand but also decline quickly during periods of substantial
excess supply. This has important policy implications at the macro level. Some researchers
have argued that capacity constraints at high levels of the output gap make it more costly
in terms of output to bring ination down once it has been relatively high. If this were the
case, optimal monetary policy rules would suggest that central banks should raise interest
rates more aggressively in response to an increase in the output gap and cut rates less
severely when they are faced with a reduction of the output gap (Schaling, 2004). The
strong responsiveness of price reductions, however, suggests that the output that has to be
sacriced to reduce ination is not that large, as rms are not reluctant to reduce prices
in the face of demand constraints. Our results are robust to the inclusion of proxies for
changes in costs and the competitive position of rms.
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47Appendix
First Order Condition for Final Goods Producers



































































and substituting equation (1) into the previous equation yields
, YtY
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which nally yields the rst order condition for the case where the constraint is non-binding
j;t  ~ j;t





In case the constraint is binding, demand for intermediate good j simply equals the
maximum supply (see equation (3) in the main part).
48First Order Condition for Intermediate Goods Producers














































































































which is equivalent to equation (8) in the main part.
49Data Sources, Statistics and Interaction Terms
Table 9: Data description
Variable Availability Description
Source: KOF quarterly manufacturing business
tendency survey
Selling Price 1984-2007 The price of the rm's main product has increased (+1),
decreased (-1) or remained unchanged (0)
in the last three months.
E(Selling Price) 1984-2007 The rm expects to rise (+1), decrease (-1)
or leave unchanged (0) its selling price
in the coming three months.
Capacity Utilisation 1984-2007 Quantitative response of the rm indicating its
capacity utilisation in production from 50 to 100 %
in the last three months
TechnicalCapconstraint 1999-2007 Firms currently are restricted in technical capacity,
yes (1) or no (0)
LabourCapconstraint 1999-2007 Firms currently are restricted in labour supply,
yes (1) or no (0)
DemandConstraint 1999-2007 Firms currently are restricted in demand for their product,
yes (1) or no (0)
E(Change in Cost) 1999-2007 The rm expects that prices for their input products and raw
materials to rise (+1), decline (-1) or remain unchanged (0).
in the coming three months.
Competitive Position 1999-2007 The competitive position within the Swiss market has
improved (+1), worsened (-1) or remained unchanged (0).
50Table 10: Summary statistics estimation sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Capacity utilisation 25608 81.949 13.119 50 110
Gap 25608 0 0.105 -0.462 0.69
Change in cap utilis 20883 0.009 0.119 -0.545 1.20
DemandConstraint 25608 0.419 0.493 0 1
TechnicalCapconstraint 25608 0.055 0.228 0 1
LabourCapconstraint 25608 0.088 0.283 0 1
Price increase exp 25608 0.140 0.347 0 1
Price decrease exp 25608 0.099 0.299 0 1
Price increased 25608 0.088 0.283 0 1
Price decreased 25608 0.158 0.365 0 1
E(Increase cost) 25608 0.300 0.458 0 1
E(Decrease cost) 25608 0.048 0.214 0 1
Competitive Position+ 25608 0.120 0.325 0 1
Competitive Position  25608 0.095 0.293 0 1
Table 11: Tetrachoric correlations
Positive Gap Negative Gap DemandConstr TechnConstr LabourConstr
Positive Gap 1.00
Negative Gap -1.00 1.00
DemandConstr -0.36 0.38 1.00
TechnConstr 0.24 -0.25 -0.36 1.00
LabourConstr 0.21 -0.23 -0.45 0.35 1.00
51Figure 9: Marginal eects of the interaction term Gap+ and TechnicalCapconstraint
The marginal eect is the dotted series (one dot for each observation and the incorrectly estimated marginal eect, that
ignores cross derivatives (line), as a function of predicted probability. Dependent variable: current price increase.
Figure 10: Consistent z-statistic of marginal eect of the interaction term Gap+ and Tech-
nicalCapconstraint
The marginal eect is the dotted series (one dot for each observation and the incorrectly estimated marginal eect, that
ignores cross derivatives (line), as a function of predicted probability. Dependent variable: current price increase.
52Figure 11: Marginal eects of the interaction term Gap+ and LabourCapconstraint
The marginal eect is the dotted series (one dot for each observation and the incorrectly estimated marginal eect, that
ignores cross derivatives (line), as a function of predicted probability. Dependent variable: current price increase.
Figure 12: Consistent z-statistic of marginal eect of the interaction term Gap+ and
LabourCapconstraint
The consistent z-statistic is the dotted series (one dot for each observation) and the inconsistent z-statistic, that ignores cross
derivatives (line), as a function of predicted probability. Dependent variable: current price increase.
53Figure 13: Marginal eects of the interaction term Gap+ and TechnicalCapconstraint
The marginal eect is the dotted series (one dot for each observation and the incorrectly estimated marginal eect, that
ignores cross derivatives (line), as a function of predicted probability. Dependent variable: expected price increase.
Figure 14: Consistent z-statistic of marginal eect of the interaction term Gap+ and Tech-
nicalCapconstraint
The consistent z-statistic is the dotted series (one dot for each observation) and the inconsistent z-statistic, that ignores cross
derivatives (line), as a function of predicted probability. Dependent variable: expected price increase.
54Figure 15: Marginal eects of the interaction term Gap+ and LabourCapconstraint
The marginal eect is the dotted series (one dot for each observation and the incorrectly estimated marginal eect, that
ignores cross derivatives (line), as a function of predicted probability. Dependent variable: expected price increase.
Figure 16: Consistent z-statistic of marginal eect of the interaction term Gap+ and
LabourCapconstraint
The consistent z-statistic is the dotted series (one dot for each observation) and the inconsistent z-statistic, that ignores cross
derivatives (line), as a function of predicted probability. Dependent variable: expected price increase.
55Figure 17: Marginal eects of the interaction term Gap  and DemandConstraint
The marginal eect is the dotted series (one dot for each observation and the incorrectly estimated marginal eect, that
ignores cross derivatives (line), as a function of predicted probability. Dependent variable: current price decrease.
Figure 18: Consistent z-statistic of marginal eect of the interaction term Gap  and De-
mandConstraint
The consistent z-statistic is the dotted series (one dot for each observation) and the inconsistent z-statistic, that ignores cross
derivatives (line), as a function of predicted probability. Dependent variable: current price decrease.
56Figure 19: Marginal eects of the interaction term Gap  and DemandConstraint
The marginal eect is the dotted series (one dot for each observation and the incorrectly estimated marginal eect, that
ignores cross derivatives (line), as a function of predicted probability. Dependent variable: expected price decrease.
Figure 20: Consistent z-statistic of marginal eect of the interaction term Gap  and De-
mandConstraint
The consistent z-statistic is the dotted series (one dot for each observation) and the inconsistent z-statistic, that ignores cross
derivatives (line), as a function of predicted probability. Dependent variable: expected price decrease.
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